British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) transmitted an undercover documentary, The Secret Policeman, which exposed racism in the British police force. A hidden camera showed, among other things, a police recruit wearing a Klu Klu Klan hood simulating -for pleasure -the beating up of an Asian. The programme was watched by 5 million people, resulted in six police offi cers resigning, and led to major reviews of police training and recruitment procedures.
Gates. However, the three police offi cers involved in Rodney King' s beating were subsequently acquitted.
Less celebrated but in some ways more impressive was Peter Karl' s investigation of the Chicago police in 1983. This took six months to research, aided by three journalism students, and resulted in the fi ve-part series, Beating Justice, transmitted on the Chicago NBC affi liate, Channel 5. It revealed shocking instances of police violence, including the use of an electric cattle iron on a suspect' s genitals and down his throat, and the transformation of a once healthy 21-year old man into a quadraplegic, following a ride in a police wagon4. These abuses were committed by a small group of offi cers, mostly on black people. They were being in eff ect hushed up, according to Karl, through large out of court settlements paid over a number of years.
The series reached 526.000 people, and became a major debating point in a local primary election. The local police chief resigned, and the Offi ce of Professional Standards overseeing the police was reformed 5 . 
BRAZILIAN JOURNALISM RESEARCH -

REINTERPRETING THE DEMOCRATIC ROLES OF THE MEDIA
Traditional Theory
All these inspiring examples of investigative journalism conform to the traditional theory of the democratic role of the media, and help to explain its continuing hold on our imagination. This theory proclaims that the fi rst democratic function of the media is to monitor the state, and shield citizens from the tyrannical abuse of its power.
The media' s second function is to brief people more generally about what is happening in the world, and enable them to exercise their responsibilities as informed citizens. According to a celebrated Royal Commission report on the press in Britain (with close similarities to the Hutchins Report in the US) 6 : 'The Press may be judged …as the chief agency for instructing the public on the main issues of the day…. The democratic form of society demands of its members an active and intelligent participation in the aff airs of their community, whether local or national. It assumes that they are suffi ciently well informed about the issues of the day to be able to form the broad judgements required by an election, and to maintain between elections the vigilance necessary in those whose governors are their servants and not their masters' 7 .
In addition to providing a faithful record of all that is important, the media should also off er a platform for diff ering points of view. They should, in the words of the British Royal Commission, 'provide a forum for the expression and exchange of opinion'
8
. By thus furnishing information and diff ering opinion, the media facilitate public debate. This leads to the formation of public opinion on the central issues of concern to society.
According to traditional theory, public opinion should infl uence the formulation and enactment of government policy. The press intercedes to ensure that this happens. The press, proclaimed Thomas Carlyle in a famous passage, is 'a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in lawmaking' 9. It speaks for the people in the corridors of power, and enables the popular supervision of government.
Adherents of traditional theory sometimes acknowledge that the government also initiates policy and communicates through the press its concerns to the public. This has prompted some to conclude that the press should really be viewed as a two-way channel of communication and infl uence between government and the governed. However, this position usually argues that the press is -or at least ought to be -mainly on the side of the public in this reciprocal relationship.
Fossilised Theory
This model celebrates media empowerment of private citizens.
Individuals are protected; briefed; reconstituted as a public body in the form of public opinion; and represented to authority. It thus places the media centre-stage, bathed in a heroic light, as the central intermediary institution of liberal democracy.
This way of thinking continues to be enormously infl uential. It informs much academic commentary on the democratic functioning of the media 10. It is reproduced in countless, self-congratulatory press editorials. Indeed, something very close to this traditionalist model is to be found at the heart of a much acclaimed study by the German political philosopher, Jurgen
Habermas 11 , and of many publications about the media and the public sphere that it inspired 12 .
Why, then, does this traditional theory seem so pious, so fossilised, so removed from the realities of contemporary life? One reason is that it downplays the role of social groups, political parties, civil society, ideology and globalisation. It seems disconnected from an understanding of how contemporary democracy works.
A second reason is that it is very narrowly concerned with political journalism. It has little to say about fi ction and entertainment, indeed about the bulk of the media consumed by most people most of the time. It off ers no clue, for example, as to how we should think about the democratic functioning of television soap opera.
Indeed, much of this tradition seems framed by a past that has little relationship to the present. Its antiquated conception of polity as being constituted by the state, private citizens and public opinion derives from late eighteenth century thought 13 . Its preoccupation with political journalism also dates from the eighteenth century when the dominant 'democratic' medium was the elite political press. Its narrow focus on the individual was reinforced in the United States by the idealisation, during the Progressive era, of the 'informed citizen' as the cornerstone of democracy 14 .
We are thus left with a worthy but anachronistic legacy. It has both good ideas and shibboleths. This perhaps account for the increasing uneasiness with which it is viewed in numerous, recent publications 
Monitoring Of Power
The element of traditional theory that has weathered best is its conception of the watchdog role of the media. Yet, even here, a case can be made for modest revision.
Traditional accounts argue that journalists should pierce the veil of secrecy surrounding public offi cials, and expose abuses of their authority. The state should be the main object of press vigilance because it has a monopoly of legitimate violence, and is the 'seat' of power.
While there is some merit in this argument, it can lead to an undue concentration on institutionalised political power, and the neglect of other forms of power -economic, social and cultural -that can also injure or restrict. A better alternative (eloquently advocated in the next chapter) is for the press to maintain critical surveillance of all areas of life.
The traditional focus on the national state also fails to register its decline. . The watchdog role of the press is perhaps best viewed as mediating the investigative resources of a free society -its whistleblowers, dissenting elite members, civil society watchdogs, independent think tanks, and critical researchers -rather than acting as a substitute for them. This makes investigative journalism seem more feasible, at a time when budget cuts and changing priorities are often making it more diffi cult.
Representation Through Partisan Journalism
More far-reaching reassessment is needed in relation to the rest of traditional theory. Since this appears in slightly diff erent forms, it is worth off ering here a fuller exposition of its 'classical' version. Its central claim is that the media's provision of information and debate enables a public consensus to emerge that guides the direction of society. The media enable people to formulate the agreed aims of society, and to secure their implementation by government with the help of 'fourth estate'
representation.
This claim is based partly on the assumption that there is an underlying unity of interest in society. Rational debate, underpinned by knowledge and good will, enables this common interest to be identifi ed. The role of the press, therefore, is to provide the necessary knowledge about public aff airs, and rational debate about its conduct, to enable citizens to arrive at a common understanding of the public interest. This tradition thus upholds the ideal of comprehensive, objective, dispassionate journalism as the gold standard to which journalists should aspire. It also views with hostility the expansion of media entertainment. This is thought to be a distraction from the serious activity of politics and self-government.
Media entertainment is also regarded as being outside the realm of rational debate since it is not evidence-based and bound by the rules of Internet is also playing a key role in promoting global activism 22 , and in assisting the building of global civil society 23 .
Most partisan and advocacy media operate within certain constraints. what it means to be poor among the rich, to be hungry among the wellfed, to be sick among the healthy……. to be unheard, unheard, unheard …in a society noisy with messages' 24 . Democracy benefi ts from having journalists in the mould of Studs Terkel, who serve the unorganised and unrepresented.
Conciliation Through Balanced Journalism
The democratic role of the media thus entails strengthening the organised groupings of civil society and the political system. It benefi ts from embracing the language of partisanship and diff erence since these are ways of exciting, involving and mobilising people in the workings of democracy. Yet, the media also need to be involved in limiting confl ict, and promoting the search for compromise.
Numerous examples point to the dangers of sectional confl ictwhether ethnic, religious or class -boiling over into violence, and leading to major atrocities or even programmes of extermination. Banal hatreds can also become embedded within sectional communities, and disable the political process, as in the case of Protestant-dominated Northern
Ireland. One mechanistic way of limiting group animosity, liable to result in actual physical violence, is to impose limits on free speech through anti-hate law. However, the more positive and constructive approach is to establish within the media system structures and precepts that promote conciliation.
This seems to pose a contradiction. How can the media system simultaneously promote both confl ict and conciliation? The answer is that the media are not a single entity. There should be a division of labour in which diff erent sectors of the media have diff erent roles, connect to society in diff erent ways, practice diff erent forms of journalism, and make diff erent contributions to the functioning of the democratic system.
The core media sector -its mass television channels and, in many countries, local monopoly dailies -are the central meeting places of society where diff erent social groups are brought into communion with one another. These core media hold the ring: they should enable divergent viewpoints and interests to be aired in reciprocal debate, and alert mainstream society to the concerns and solutions of minority groups.
The norm of journalism practiced by this core sector should be that of In short, one central defect of traditional theory is that it ignores the highly diff erentiated nature of contemporary media systems. Instead of thinking of the media as a unitary institution, it makes more sense to recognise that diff erent media sectors and styles of journalism contribute diff erent things to the democratic process. What these diff erent parts contribute varies, to some extent, between countries, and over time.
Thus, the integrative role of the core media sector is being eroded in a number of countries. The growth in the number of television channels is subdividing the mass television audience, and weakening the ability of mass television to stage collective debates that bring together divergent groups in an inclusive, conciliatory process -though not to the degree that is often claimed 25 . Some monopoly local dailies are orienting themselves increasingly towards the affl uent sections of their local communities, because these attract higher advertising revenue than low income readers 26 . This undermines their ability to stage an inclusive dialogue.
If these trends continue, core media will become less eff ective. Their work in promoting a political culture of compromise, and in brokering a measure of prior agreement within the public sphere, will have to be shouldered increasingly by the governmental system. This will make democratic government more diffi cult 27 .
Multidirectional Flows
The media aff ord intricate pathways linking the constituent parts of the democratic system. Thus, much prestige journalism takes the form of a horizontal conversation between elites The multiple fl ows of communication and infl uence generated by the media should facilitate the functioning of the democratic system in certain important ways. These can be summarised as sustaining adequate levels of political information and participation; strengthening civil society and the representative system; facilitating the building of coalitions and the forging of communities of identity; aiding the co-ordination and responsiveness of the democratic system; and sustaining a culture of democracy.
Political Dimensions of Entertainment
Traditional theory is mistaken in excluding 'non-political' media content from its understanding of democratic processes. Media fi ction and entertainment can infl uence whom people identify with, their understandings of society and where they feel that they fi t within it. This can aff ect profoundly people's politics. Whether people defi ne themselves for example in terms of nationality, locality, ethnicity, gender, religion, generation, class or sexual orientation, and how they articulate these diff erent elements, often has an important bearing on whom they become in 'political' terms.
There is extensive evidence confi rming that popular media consumption is bound up with social identity. Thus, teen cultural fashions are often ways of expressing a desire to belong to a particular group, and of excluding others 32 . Sub-cultural style, expressed in music and clothes, can involve a complex negotiation of pressures exerted by parents and peer groups, of competing sources of identity, and even of neighbourhood change and folk memory, in ways that can pull people to the right or left 33 . Online role-playing off ers a way in which some explore who they are, and what it is like to be someone else, with implications for identity politics 34 .
Media consumption can also be bound up with how social groups defi ne -and also redefi ne -themselves, and their relationship to others.
Highly stratifi ed media consumption sustained a strong class identity that underpinned historically the political rise of the labour movement 35 .
The 'black is beautiful' movement, refl ected in ethnic popular culture in the late 1960s and 1970s, fuelled the rejection of a parental culture of 'respectability', and supported more militant political campaigning for equal rights by a new generation 36 . Gay fi lms, novels, journalism and even television fi ction also gave expression to a collective, increasingly confi dent 'gay is good' movement that confronted homophobia, and signifi cantly infl uenced public attitudes and legislation in numerous 
Self-Regulation
Self-rule is not confi ned to elections, and participation in the political life of society. It is not only about making and enforcing law, public administration, delivering public services. It also involves informal self-regulation based public norms. These are the tacit prescriptions, conventions and expectations that guide how we act -whether we stand in line or rush to the front, how we fulfi l certain social roles (for example as parent or child), what we feel is appropriate behaviour in myriad situations. These norms are, in a broad sense, collectively arrived at, maintained and enforced. They are acquired through early socialisation, internalised, and supported through social interaction. They are also subject to periodic revision, and can weaken or strengthen over time. The logic of this reassessment points therefore to the need to include entertainment in our understanding of the democratic role of the media.
Broadly, the same arguments that were marshalled in relation to journalism apply also to non-factual media content. It is desirable that major subcultural groups have the communications resources necessary to explore and formulate their concerns, and communicate these to others; and that these concerns are addressed and debated by the wider society through mass media. The equivalent of a culture of civil democracy outlined earlier should also inform this wider debate. One of its central features is
that 'other' groups should be portrayed with understanding rather than malignant contempt. The humanistic argument of the Hutchins Report, written over half a century ago, is especially applicable in the contemporary context of growing tension between Islam and the Christian west:
'The truth about any social group, though it should not exclude its weaknesses and vices, includes also recognition of its values, its aspirations, and its common humanity. …..If people are exposed to the inner truth of the life of a particular group, they will gradually build up respect for and understanding of it' 43 .
But while non-factual media fulfi l a democratic role, they do not 
Tension Between Market and Democracy
The question -what does democracy require? -is answered by some with stark simplicity: only free market media. By anchoring the media to the market, it is argued, the media become free of government and answerable to the people. Only in these circumstances can the media fulfi l their democratic purpose. There is general agreement also that the media should serve democracy by carrying information about public aff airs. However, this information has only a minority market. The solution to this problem in Britain is to ration: popular national papers (accounting for three out of four sales) devote less than 20 per cent of their editorial content to public aff airs 53 . The solution chosen by American local TV in the 1990s was to give prominence to crime because it was both cheap and popular (particularly if it included human interest drama, car chase action or contained ingredients that aroused fear or indignation). However, the eff ect of this sensible market strategy was to misinform. Large nightly doses of local crime led growing numbers of people to think that crime was America's biggest problem, even at a time when crime was actually falling 54 .It also fostered simplifi ed or mistaken perceptions of crime that encouraged racial animosity 55 .
A strong case can be made in principle that partisanship extends the diversity of the media, and contributes to the functioning of democracy. 
American Dilemma
Two broad strategies have been adopted to tackle these problems 58 .One is the social market approach: state support of minority media, typifi ed by selective press and fi lm subsidy schemes introduced in numerous countries, in order to sustain media diversity and collective self-expression. The other is the public service approach: encouraging television and radio to serve democracy -by informing the public, adhering to norms of balanced journalism, aiming for quality -through public regulation or ownership.
These two approaches are part of mainstream politics in Europe, supported by Christian Democrat and Social Democrat parties alike. The public service approach also enjoys strong support in some democratic countries in Asia, Africa, Australia and Latin America.
However, what seems unexceptionable in many parts of the globe is deeply contentious in the United States. Instead, the US has taken a diff erent path: the nurturing of a public interest culture among American media professionals in a way that bypasses the state. This was the social responsibility strategy promulgated by the celebrated Hutchins Report.
Although it generated conventions criticised by radical American academics for promoting Establishment journalism beholden to power-holders 59 , it eased the confl ict between market and democracy, and made on balance for better journalism 60 .
However, the Hutchins 'fi x' is becoming unfi xed. The professional power and autonomy of American media staff is weakening, and its public service culture is under siege. This puts American democrats (with a small 'd') in a dilemma. Policies pursued around the world cannot be contemplated in America (partly because of the failure of its PBS system); yet the American, social responsibility strategy is in trouble. It seems likely to be in still greater trouble in the future because of the changes that are taking place in American media.
What is the solution? Finding one matters not only for Americans.
The quality of American democracy and American media is now a global concern because the United States dominates the world.
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